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Impartiality, Close Friendships and  
the Confucian Tradition
Andrew Lambert
Abstract
This article explores the relationship between friendship and morality. Two ideas have 
been influential in the history of moral philosophy: the impartial standpoint and close 
friendship. These two perspectives on thought and action can conflict, however, and 
such a case is presented here.
In an attempt to resolve these tensions, and understand the assumption that gives 
rise to it, I explore an alternative conception of moral conduct and friendship sug-
gested by early Confucian thought. Within this account, moral conduct is that which 
aims at harmony, understood as the appropriate blending of different elements. 
This   suggests  a conception of friendship that realizes harmony through a focus on 
shared activities, and the quality of interaction achieved between people as they par-
ticipate in shared social events. This account offers a novel way of conceptualizing 
friendship, which also avoids the tension between the impartial standpoint and close 
friendship.
 Introduction
In his book on friendship, William Rawlins recalls the following story:
A man living in a small town in the mid-western United States, who I’ll 
call Hank, was about to go bankrupt. However, Hank had come up with a 
solution to his financial problems that he confided to his best friend, who 
I’ll call Barry. Hank informed Barry that he had decided to set fire to his 
own business. He figured that the insurance settlement on the loss would 
clear up his debts and put him in pretty good shape to start fresh with 
another venture. Soon after their conversation, Hank torched his store. 
Unfortunately, the flames destroyed more than he planned. Before the 
local fire department could extinguish the blaze, it burned down most of 
the block of buildings making up the economic centre of the small town 
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where they both lived. Due to the circumstances of the fire and some 
incriminating evidence about its cause, Hank was charged with arson.1
As Rawlins narrates the story, the jury is leaning towards acquitting Hank, and 
Barry is faced with a dilemma: should he testify about his conversation with 
Hank to ensure justice is done? Doing so would betray his friend’s trust and 
possibly destroy the relationship. But not doing so would condemn innocent 
fellow citizens to suffer economic harm. What should Barry do?
To make clearer the conflict inherent in this kind of situation, we might 
modify the story. Substitute Hank and Barry for two friends from a minority 
population within society, whether by gender, ethnicity or other grouping. 
Further, assume they highly value membership of that group and also believe 
that their interests are not always adequately represented by the law or major-
ity opinion. Next, swap the small town for a large city; exactly who is affected 
becomes less clear, involves more strangers unknown to the protagonists and 
fewer familiar faces before which Hank and Barry feel shame. In this way, the 
importance of the friendship is heightened, and the community enlarged and 
made less personal, arguably making resolution of the dilemma more difficult.
Barry’s dilemma is a vivid illustration of a conflict between two well- 
established practices or ideals: impartiality and close friendship. In one corner 
is impartiality: the belief that all people are to be treated equally and no one is 
to receive preferential treatment. Impartiality in the story arises partly in the 
demand for impartiality in the legal system. The presiding judge and jury must 
not have any personal interests in the case, and set aside personal biases to 
judge in an impartial manner. The figure of Lady Justice is blindfolded.
But the image of an impartial judge weighing up all relevant considerations 
also describes Barry himself. Barry is called upon to recognize the interests of 
all members of the community and to set aside his personal bond with Hank in 
his deliberations. Impartiality demands that all members of a community be 
treated fairly. If Barry views the situation and himself in this way, as a citizen, 
he would probably testify against Hank.
From Barry’s perspective as a close friend of Hank’s, however, it is precisely 
the personal and particularistic bond that matters. While there are many kinds 
of friendship, close friendships are often distinguished by a heightened inter-
est in and caring about one or more particular persons; and this attitude is not 
extended to others. Valuing his bond with Hank leads Barry to remain silent 
and save his friend from prosecution.
1 Rawlins, Compass of Friendship, 2.
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Barry’s dilemma derives from the fact that a person can reasonably adopt 
two very different perspectives on the situation, based on impartiality and 
close friendship respectively, which give rise to conflicting courses of action. 
The tension is particularly acute because both impartiality and close personal 
bonds are often treated as foundational features of ethical living. In what fol-
lows, I explore this tension by considering how the two have been presented 
in the Western philosophical canon, stretching from Aristotle through to the 
European Enlightenment and its heirs, and highlight their incongruent and 
sometimes confusing relationship. Of particular interest is how equating im-
partiality with morality marginalizes the value of close friendship, denying it 
any intrinsic moral worth.
Exploring the tangled relationship between impartiality, close friendships 
and morality prepares the ground for a look at the Confucian tradition, which 
offers resources to re-conceptualize friendship and moral conduct. By offering 
alternative accounts of both, Confucian thought helps articulate an integrated 
account of friendship and morality. This in turn invites reflection on, and per-
haps even revision of, the place of impartiality and close friendships in ethical 
thought.
 Impartiality as a Moral Ideal
In Barry’s dilemma, the community that Barry should view impartially is lim-
ited to a small town. But as the modified example suggested, impartiality can 
have a much wider remit. At its limit, the impartial standpoint point tran-
scends social and national divides and is sensitive to all morally considerable 
beings. This might be all humans, all rational agents, all pain-sensitive beings 
or some other constituency. This perspective takes into account the interests 
of all affected parties and grants special consideration to none. Particular per-
sonal attachments do not carry any special significance. They are, as it were, 
invisible (this is not to say that personal relationships as an institution or a 
way of life do not figure in this view, only that relationships between particular 
people are irrelevant).
In the tradition of moral thought that emphasizes this approach, this impar-
tial standpoint is described as sub specie aeternitatis (from the perspective of 
eternity) or the ‘God’s eye’ perspective. It is a privileged vantage point, which 
produces clarity of thought without partiality towards the self—the ideal 
foundation for moral judgment. This ideal standpoint is expressed in Christian 
theology and the natural law tradition, as an ordered world created by God, 
and in which the human good and the right could be known by the human 
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mind. As theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, wrote, “In ethical decisions, a man 
must consider his action sub specie aeternitatis and then, no matter how it pro-
ceeds, it will proceed rightly.”2
Although the metaphysical worldview supporting such a moral viewpoint 
largely disappeared, along with confidence that the human good can be so 
readily known, the idea survived in some secular ethics. Immanuel Kant, for 
example, tried to build reasoning from the impartial standpoint into the basic 
structure of rational thought. Acting morally was acting rationally—i.e., acting 
only from those maxims or principles that “belong in a universal legislation.”3 
More recently, John Rawls’s use of the ‘original position’ in A Theory of Justice 
offers a contemporary example of this ideal. Rawls writes:
Thus to see our place in society from perspective of this position [the 
original position] is to see it sub specie aeternitatis: it is to regard the 
 human situation not only from all social but also from all temporal points 
of view.”4
This conception of the impartial standpoint is particularly important because 
it provides the framework for an influential modern conception of moral think-
ing. It makes possible a concise intellectual test for moral rightness: an action 
or policy is judged right or wrong depending on how it affects all members of 
this extended community, and this is known by adopting the impartial point of 
view. Influential moral theories developed since the European Enlightenment, 
especially Kantian and Utilitarian moral theories, adopt this approach.
The details of this moral test vary by theory, but all rely on some kind of 
impartial perspective. In utilitarian theory, an action is right if it produces 
greater overall utility or better consequences than any other option, impartial-
ly considered. In Kantian moral theorizing, an action is permissible if it can be 
‘universalized’—if it is acceptable to any rational agent in a similar situation, 
where both agents and the situation are understood impersonally, as if viewed 
from the God’s eye vantage point. In both theories, a conclusive justification 
of action can only be made from the impartial viewpoint.5 Returning to our 
2 Bonhoeffer, Testament to Freedom, 350.
3 Kant, Groundwork, 53.
4 587. R.M. Hare’s metaphor of the omniscient ‘archangel’ in his theory is another example of 
this ideal vantage point (see Essays in Moral Thinking, 189–90).
5 For a recent account of Kantian moral theory, see Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity; a recent 
consequentialist account is Petit, “The Consequentialist Perspective.”
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 dilemma, acting under the guidance of such theories would lead Barry to tes-
tify against Hank.
 Close Friendships
The tradition of equating moral conduct with the adoption of the impartial per-
spective, however, is only one way of conceptualizing moral conduct. One rival 
approach, which can be traced back to Aristotle, begins from an  examination 
of the value of close friendships.6 While close friendships can be conceptu-
alized in various ways, two particular features have been used to distinguish 
them from other friendships and relationships. The first is acquaintance and 
familiarity with the friend, a knowledge of ‘who they really are,’ which requires 
time, effort and commitment to achieve. The second is a non-instrumental 
concern to promote the friend’s interests. These two themes figure prominent-
ly in discussions of friendship in the same philosophical tradition.7
In the Nicomachean Ethics, for example, Aristotle offers a threefold categori-
zation of philia, often translated as friendship. He distinguishes friendships of 
pleasure, utility and character, with character (or close) friendships being the 
most valuable and stable. These are based on knowledge of the other’s good 
character, acquired over time and through sustained interaction. As  Aristotle 
notes, “Though the wish for friendship comes quickly, the friendship does 
not.”8 Partly because of such knowledge, a friend comes to be regarded as ‘an-
other self.’9 Further, this knowledge and the personal attachment it generates 
are necessary conditions for a robust non-instrumental concern for the friend’s 
good. In Aristotle’s words, one must wish goods to friends “for their own sake.”10
6 Anthologies exploring morally relevant features of friendship include and LaFollette and 
Graham Person to Person; Pakaluk, Other Selves; Badhwar, Friendship.
7 Other features are associated with close friendships. These include shared time together, 
the enjoyment of each other’s company, shared activity, some measure of equality or reci-
procity, and privacy and the exclusive disclosure of information. However, the two fea-
tures (acquaintance and familiarity; a non-instrumental concern to promote the friend’s 
interests) seem particularly important to close friendship and its moral authority, and 
form an important contrast with a kind of friendship in Confucian thought, discussed 
below.
8 Nicomachean Ethics 1156b30.
9 Nicomachean Ethics 1170b5.
10 Nicomachean Ethics 1155b30. Cf. “Goodwill is inactive friendship and that when it lasts 
some time, and they grow accustomed to each other, it becomes friendship,” ibid. 1167a10. 
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Later thinkers also develop these themes,11 but Montaigne expresses this 
kind of close friendship in its purest and most complete form: as both com-
plete familiarity and perfect union of wills. He recalls Cicero’s account of the 
friendship between the great Roman leader Tiberius Gracchus and confidant 
Caius Blosius, and regards his own friendship with Etienne de la Boetie as simi-
lar in nature:
Having committed themselves absolutely to each other, either [Gracchus 
or Blosius] held absolutely the reins of each other’s inclinations…Not one 
of [de la Boetie’s] actions could be presented to me, whatever appear-
ance it might have, that I could not immediately find the motive for it…
Not only did I know his soul as well as mine, but I should have trusted 
myself to him more readily than to myself.12
Montaigne also makes a striking claim about how and when close friendships 
should guide action. He writes, “a single dominant friendship dissolves all 
other obligations.”13 On this view, close friendships enjoy priority over other 
considerations and can provide the most fundamental guide to how to live. 
This prioritizing of close friendships is also a contemporary theme. The nov-
elist E.M. Forster expressed the importance of trust in particularly dramatic 
fashion: “if I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my 
friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country.”14
These claims for the importance of close friendships convey a moral force, 
and substantial arguments have been made that they are crucial for an ethi-
cal life. Close friendships might be necessary for well-being or flourishing for 
many reasons, including the need for mutual assistance, having someone to 
share ideas with and so develop them, being loved and loving, the delight of 
shared activities. As Aristotle writes, “No one would choose to live without 
friends, even if he had all the other goods.”15 He declares friendship “is a  virtue 
or involves virtue.”16 Personal flourishing is a reasonable aim for any life, and 
since close friendships are necessary for this end they enjoy precedence in 
Whether Aristotle thinks goodwill is ever entirely unconditional is debatable; however, 
later thinkers have conceived of close friendship in this way (e.g. Badhwar, Friendship).
11 See for example, Cicero, On Old Age, 30.
12 “Of Friendship.” For Montaigne, so pure is the close friendship bond that it can be shared 
only with one other person; plurality is compatible only with ‘common friendships’ (195).
13 Ibid.
14 Forster, “What I Believe,” 68.
15 Nicomachean Ethics 1155a5.
16 Nicomachean Ethics 1155a2.
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thought and action. In contemporary literature, Bernard Williams makes a 
similar argument.17 Whatever morality demands, a person needs the motiva-
tion to respond to those demands. But without personal relationships (and 
personal projects) to structure our lives, we lose the motivation to act at all. 
Therefore whatever morality is or demands of us, it must accommodate, i.e., 
be restricted by, personal relationships. Close friendships are thus central to an 
account of an ethical life.
A second way in which close friendships are made crucial to an ethical life 
is by equating moral conduct with genuine and non-instrumental care for an-
other person’s good or interests. Close friendships, like mother-child relation-
ships, are a paradigm example of this form of conduct. This approach is seen 
in the contemporary development of an ethics of care.18
Evidently, there are several prima facie reasons why close friendships might 
be a decisive influence in settling moral questions. These arguments support 
the view that Barry is right to structure his decisions around the interests and 
needs of Hank.
The preceding case study and discussion suggest that a tension exists be-
tween the moral ideal of the impartial standpoint and the practices of close 
friendship. Judgments from the impartial standpoint require that one’s own 
interests, background, education, gender, social class, et cetera not influence 
those judgments; but those personal characteristics and the motivations flow-
ing from them are precisely what provides the raw material of close friend-
ships. Furthermore, moral judgments informed by the impartial standpoint 
can be universalized—they apply to anyone in the same situation; but the 
practical decisions of friendship are not usually like this. They are directed at 
particular people and situations and not intended as general prescriptions. 
The ideal of impartiality thus threatens to push friendship out of the realm of 
ethical practices. This leads to the question: which should take priority?
 Moral Qualms about the Impartial Standpoint and  
Close Friendships
Both prongs of the fork lead to difficulties. First, several moral philosophers 
reject the equating of the impartial viewpoint and the moral theories de-
rived from them—including Kantian and Utilitarian theories—with moral 
17 Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality.”
18 Gilligan, In a Different Voice; Held, “Non-contractual Society.”
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 conduct.19 One argument, stemming from Hegel’s criticism of Kant, is moral 
reasoning that attempts to represent how a universal community lapses into 
an empty formalism. The abstract moral principles derived from this imagined 
perspective—such as rules as acting only in ways that are acceptable to all 
rational agents—provide little meaningful guide to action: they are too far re-
moved from the concrete situations of everyday life. Others have argued that 
the impartial viewpoint, a view from nowhere, is impractical or humanly un-
achievable.20 Marilyn Friedman, for example, argues that it is impractical.21 
While presuming to reason impartially, a person has no way to confirm that 
their thinking is genuinely impartial and free from bias or prejudices. The 
impartial perspectives required by modern moral theories are, according to 
Friedman, “extraordinary cognitive feats.”22 Others have argued that it is unde-
sirable because attempts to view things from an impartial perspective obscure 
important differences between individual perspectives.23 Attempts to imag-
inatively take on the perspective of others can cause that perspective to be 
 unwittingly reduced to something like one’s own. This criticism is particularly 
relevant to R.M. Hare’s formulation of impartiality, where the moral subject 
must adopt the perspective of each party involved.24
Philosopher Bernard Williams regards the elevated status of impartialist 
morality as a contingent historical creation rather than a rational principle.25 
He describes its emphasis on the obligation to meet the demands of the im-
partial perspective as the ‘morality system,’ and sees the historical origins of 
its popularity in specific Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant. The ideal of an 
impartial standpoint subsequently became dominant because it suited emerg-
ing forms of social organization—the rise of bureaucratic forms of manage-
ment and public rationality relied on an impartial viewpoint. But the impartial 
viewpoint is only one possible foundation of morality, and its authority can be 
questioned without rejecting morality. This gives us cause to consider alterna-
tive foundations for morality.
19 On Kant’s views on friendship, see his “Lecture on Friendship.”
20 See Friedman, What are Friends For? ; Young, “Asymmetrical Reciprocity”; MacIntyre, 
 After Virtue.
21 Friedman, What are Friends For? 18–27.
22 Ibid., 22. Friedman is responding to the Kantian contractualism of Rawls and R.M. Hare’s 
utilitarianism, but her arguments apply to all similar theories.
23 Young, “Asymmetrical Reciprocity,” 41.
24 Hare, Essays in Moral Thinking.
25 See Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, esp. Chap. 10.
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There are also reasons to doubt that close friendships can provide a founda-
tion for moral conduct.26 For one, they are typically insensitive to impartiality. 
Regardless of the limitations of the impartial moral standpoint, impartiality is 
an important moral ideal: getting people to consider the interests a wider set 
of people, beyond friends and loved ones (or, worse, only themselves). This 
practical and motivational challenge is neglected in close friendships, where 
motivations focus on a small set of people.27
Further, the non-instrumental concern often identified with close friend-
ships may not be a morally pure motivation.28 Søren Kierkegaard argued that 
it derives from self-love and, unlike the impartial position, self-love is a poor 
basis for moral justification.29 How a person responds to, and befriends, others 
is based on his or her own (usually beloved) dispositions and characteristics. 
Those people similar to what Kant called the ‘dear self ’ may be liked, and dif-
ferences present opportunities for learning or entertainment. Self-less concern 
was supposedly central to close friendships’ moral authority, but this argument 
suggests its motivations are parasitic on self-love.30 This leads Kierkegaard to 
agree that friendship contains ‘no ethical task.’31
These arguments question the moral authority of close friendships. They 
also raise the question of whether there are other forms of friendship that bet-
ter accommodate the demands of morality, and impartiality in particular. In 
response to this, and to the doubts about the impartial moral standpoint, it 
is helpful to consider how other traditions have conceived of the relationship 
between morality and friendship. Examining the classical Confucian tradition 
reveals an alternative way of conceptualizing both; moreover, it avoids the 
26 On the moral danger of friendship, see Cocking and Kennett, “Friendship and Moral 
 Danger”; Rachels, “Morality, Parents, and Children.”
27 Some argue that caring about particular others brings about wider concern (Williams, 
Morality, Chap. 1. But others argue that concern for a particular person can make people’s 
interests less open to others (Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality, Chap. 2; friendship 
can form an exclusionary ‘mutual admiration society’ (Lewis, Four Loves, 88).
28 See Kierkegaard, Works of Love, Sec. II.B.
29 Ibid., 60–72.
30 The experience of jealousy supports this view. Genuine non-instrumental concern should 
result in delight whenever a friend benefits, regardless of benefactor; but jealousy is 
sometimes experienced when others are the providers of such benefit. This suggests a 
selfish expectation that it is “I” who should be benefactor. Similarly, Gore Vidal’s com-
ment, “Whenever a friend succeeds, a little something in me dies” is insightful (“A profile 
of Gore Vidal, whose latest novel, Burr, will be published early next year,” The Sunday 
Times Magazine, 16 September, 1973).
31 Kierkegaard Works of Love, 58.
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 tension between the impartial standpoint and close friendships, since neither 
feature in it.
 A Confucian Moral Ideal: Harmony
First, some clarifications are necessary. Discussion of the Confucian tradition 
will focus on the classical Confucian texts: the Analects, the Mencius and the 
Xunzi, and other texts that informed early Confucian discourse. In extrapo-
lating the embryonic theories of these texts, I am not implying that the early 
Confucians explicitly discussed friendship in the ways presented here. Rather, 
the aim is an interpretation of classical Confucian concepts that speaks to con-
temporary issues.32 Further, focusing on one conception of friendship does not 
mean that others were absent, or that it is unique to Confucian texts or cul-
ture, but only that it is relevant to the tension between close friendships and 
impartiality.
How did the early Confucians understand ‘morality?’ Arguably, it was not 
from an impartial standpoint. We noted above that some scholars rejected the 
impartial perspective as the foundation of morality. In fact, some female writ-
ers suspect that it reflects a male point of view,33 and seek an alternative foun-
dational moral concept that includes the experiences of women. One such 
alternative foundation was suggested by Annette Baier: trust.34 In the same 
spirit, I suggest that the early Confucian texts also offer an alternative moral 
foundation: they regarded harmony (hé 和) as the guiding ideal of action.35 
Such harmony is central to an alternative conception of friendship, discussed 
below.
32 Interpreting ancient texts in light of contemporary interests is an established practice 
within China’s commentarial tradition. For example, Yuet Keung Lo (“Teacher-Disciple 
or Friends?”) examines how understandings of peng—a term for friendship—in the Ana-
lects have varied in different eras, according to the needs of that era.
33 Gilligan, In a Different Voice.
34 Baier, “What do Women Want,” 27–32.
35 Compare this with other interpretations, including a conservative emphasis on uphold-
ing the traditional rituals of Antiquity (Schwartz, World of Thought in Ancient China), 
reading the Analects as a handbook of self-cultivation, (Hall and Ames, Thinking through 
Confucius), and reading it as an early form of role ethics. Harmony has a range of mean-
ings in the early Chinese corpus, not all of which concern us. It also refers to a kind of 
cosmic unity of earth, humans and the heavens; accord between humans and nature; the 
smooth running of society and general social accord; or people performing the duties ap-
propriate to their social position.
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Chenyang Li writes, “hé 和 is probably the most cherished ideal in Chinese 
culture.”36 To understand why, it is helpful to contrast the metaphysical as-
sumptions (or lack thereof) that sustain it with those behind the European 
Enlightenment ideal of impartial judgment applied to an extended and ab-
stract moral constituency. The latter reflects the belief that once subjective 
perspectives were removed, there remained some form of rational and know-
able structure that guided moral judgments. The underlying structure was 
posited in various ways. These include an orderly world created by God, a 
mechanistic universe governed by empirically discoverable laws, confidence 
in the measurability and commensurability of key human values like pain and 
pleasure and of human welfare in general, and even a generic rational agent 
upon which universal moral prescriptions could be based. Theoretical impar-
tiality, as a special standard of appeal, made sense given one or more of these 
commitments.
The classical Confucian texts, however, largely lack this confidence in an un-
derlying order. The Analects, in particular, rejects such metaphysical specula-
tion.37 Without it, moral judgments have a more local and limited range, apply-
ing to the situations before or around the individual, not to abstract standards 
of order. Moral judgment becomes relational and contextual judgments of ap-
propriateness (harmony), or judgments grounded in concrete social rules and 
norms lacking any deeper form of justification aside from appeal to precedent.
Without this underlying metaphysical framework to guide judgment, the 
practical ideal of harmony has a profoundly relational quality. It might be char-
acterized as unity or good fit between different parts or features. In contrast to 
the moral theories discussed earlier, the relation between the parts is not cap-
tured by a single concept or measure, one that unifies and makes all elements 
commensurable. The rightness of actions is revealed in the degree to which 
they display coherence, mutual fit or an organic complementarity among the 
assembled elements. This contextual and pragmatic attempt to find harmony 
among diverse elements is well-expressed by a culinary metaphor:
Harmony (hé) is like making soup. One needs water, fire, vinegar, sauce, 
salt, and plum to cook fish and meat. One needs to cook them with 
36 Li, “The Confucian Ideal of Harmony,” 583.
37 Confucius refuses to speculate about supernatural issues such as spirits (7.21) and did not 
discuss cosmology; he did not ‘speculate,’ ‘claim or demand certainty,’ and was ‘not inflex-
ible’ (9.4). The capacity of language to fully explicate or represent the effects of action is 
also questioned (2.13, 4.22). All translations from Ames and Rosemont, The Analects of 
Confucius, unless otherwise indicated.
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 firewood, combine (hé) them together in order to balance the taste. One 
needs to compensate for deficiencies and reduce excessiveness.38
As with cooking, so action in general requires an integrating of multiple ele-
ments that defies simple formulae. Admittedly, the lack of objective standards 
might render harmony a problematic ideal in some areas. Lacking the basis for 
critique and opposition, it might give rise to a conservative political order, for 
example. But harmony is highly apposite for one part of the Confucian moral 
vision: personal bonds and relationships.
 Confucian Morality and Personal Relationships39
The importance of personal bonds and relationships to Confucian morality is 
made explicit in the Confucian doctrine of the five cardinal relationships (wu-
lun 五倫). This promotes social harmony through the five relationships most 
fundamental to social order: ruler-minister, father-son, husband-wife, older-
younger (or older brother-younger brother) and friend-friend.40 The five bonds 
are often thought of as social roles, such as father or son, the good performance 
of which is integral both to individual cultivation and a harmonious society.41
Friendship is one of the five cardinal relationships, and is presented in 
different ways in the early texts.42 Close friendships are one such form. The 
38 Legge, The Chinese Classics, 5:684.
39 For this section especially, cf. Obeyesekere, “The Concept of Friendship in the Jātaka 
Tales,” Wei-cheng Chu, “The Utility of ‘Translated’ Friendship for the Sinophone World,” 
and especially Ping Wang’s etymological overview, “The Chinese Concept of Friendship” 
in this volume.
40 Mencius 3A4 reads: “He [the sage-ruler Shun] appointed Xie minister of education in 
order to teach people about human relations: that between parents and child there is 
affection; between ruler and minister rightness; between husband and wife, separate 
functions; between older and younger, proper order; and between friends, trustworthi-
ness,” Bloom (2009) 57. (All Mencius translations from this edition.).
41 Analects 1.2 is the classic statement of family life as the foundation of social order.
42 Friendship’s reception in the tradition is mixed. Some have argued that it became an 
object of suspicion (Kutcher, “The Fifth Relationship”). Its alternative loyalties allegedly 
threatened an imperial order in which the family was sacred, and a model for political 
order in which the emperor was “father” to the people. As dynastic order faded, some 
reformers saw friendship as key to a new Confucian order, as a relationship founded on 
equality and not hierarchy (Tan, Renxue).
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relationship between musician Bo Ya and Zhong Ziqi, described in the Lushi 
Chunqiu [Spring and Autumn Annals of Master Lu], is the paradigm example:
Whenever Bo Ya played the qin, Zhong Ziqi would listen to him. Once 
when he was playing the qin, his thoughts turned to Mount Tai. Zhong 
Ziqi said, ‘How splendidly you play the qin! Lofty and majestic like Mount 
Tai.’ A short time later, when his thoughts turned to rolling waters, Zhong 
Ziqi said, ‘How splendidly you play the qin! Rolling and swelling like a 
rushing river.’ When Zhong Ziqi died, Bo Ya smashed the qin and cut its 
strings. To the end of his life, he never played the qin again because he felt 
that there was no one in the world worth playing it for. This applies not 
only to the qin, but to worthiness as well.43
However, close friendships are not the most important kind of friendship in the 
texts. Friendship is often portrayed as a role in the Analects (2.21, 5.25).  Unlike 
father and son, where antagonisms are avoided in order to preserve closeness 
(Mencius 7A35), friends are to be “demanding” with each other, urging each 
other along the Confucian way and helping to cultivate character (9.25, 12.23). 
The Chinese character for friendship (you 友) is glossed in the Book of Rites 
and elsewhere as “those with the same aspiration” (tongzhi 同志 ; Duan 1974), 
while another term for friendship, peng (朋), is glossed as “those having the 
same master” (tongmen 同門 , lit. belonging to the same school). This friend-
ship thus has a quasi-instrumental form; a friend is someone who can contrib-
ute to a person’s cultivation and refinement.44
The relationship between Bo Ya and Zhong Ziqi is important in another re-
spect, however. In construing friendship in terms of musicality, it points to-
wards another kind of Confucian friendship, one particularly relevant to the 
tension between friendship and impartiality. Music here serves as a  metaphor 
for a different kind of harmony: the harmonizing of affective or emotional 
experiences. To anticipate, the friendship to be explored might be called 
event friendship. Unlike close friendships, this does not require long-standing 
 acquaintance with another or non-instrumental concern for his or her well-
being. It is distinguished by coordinated activity that creates social events dis-
tinguished by their affective quality. To unpack this requires a look at how the 
Confucians blended the emotions (especially delight), music, and ritual into a 
picture of worthwhile social activity.
43 Knoblock and Riegel, The Annals of Lü Buwei, 308.
44 For a contemporary discussion of Confucian friendship based on self-cultivation, see Hall 
and Ames, “Confucian Friendship: The Road to Religiousness.”
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 Affective Harmony and Delight
The exemplary Confucian is not characterized by reflective moral judgments 
aiming at impartiality, but as someone with a rich emotional life, and whose 
emotions are in harmony. The Confucian classic, the Zhongyong (中庸), often 
called The Doctrine of the Mean, is an account of the ideal Confucian subject or 
sage. Its opening section explains harmony as follows:
Happiness and anger, sorrow and joy; before they arise this is called bal-
anced; arising in the proper rhythms ( jie 節) this is called harmonious 
(hé 和). Balanced, this is the great root of the world; harmonious, this is 
the ultimate path of the world. Reaching balanced harmony, the heavens 
and earth take their proper place and the myriad things and events of the 
world are thereby nurtured.45
Harmony is the appropriate experiencing of joy, anger, sorrow and delight, 
and this is the “ultimate path of the world.” Such appropriate affective experi-
ence is a precondition of wider social responsibility and ability to influence 
the “myriad things and events of the world.” In short, affective experience is 
treated as a reliable guide to practical action.46 However, “appropriate” affec-
tive experience is not simply a balance among emotions, with none experi-
enced to excess; nor does it mean a temperate disciplining of inner feelings, 
achieved in spite of the pressures of the everyday world. The ideal affective life 
attains a rhythmic or dynamic attunement (jie 節) with events in the social 
world.  Another Confucian classic, the Book of Songs (Shijing) illustrates this 
social and inter-subjective character of affective harmony. Ode 161 contains the 
following:
The deer sound pleasantly as they graze in the field,
I entertain honorable guests with the music of drums and strings
45 Sec. 1, translation mine.
46 The title “Zhongyong” is relevant to the account of ideal conduct developed here. It is com-
posed of two characters, zhong 中 and yong 庸. Zhong means focus, balance, hitting the 
target, or maintaining a dynamic equilibrium. Yong means “everyday,” “commonplace,” 
with the character originally denoting the menial task of de-husking rice. The importance 
of focusing on the everyday and commonplace—including personal interactions—as an 
ethical task is thus implicit in the title. Section three of the Zhongyong makes this explicit: 
“Focusing the familiar affairs of the day is a task of the highest order. It is rare among the 
common people to be able to sustain it for long” (Hall and Ames, Focusing the Familiar, 
Sec. 3).
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With such beautiful music, there are profound harmony (hé) and joy (le).
With elegant wines, I entertain the heart of the honorable guest.47
Similarly, Ode 164 includes:
Enjoying the dishes and wines with all your brothers,
There are harmony (hé) and joy (le) like playful children.
Enjoying the union with wife and children,
It is like the mingling of drums and strings.
With brothers in concord there are profound harmony and joy.
Thus you bring good to house and home,
Joy to wife and child.
I have deeply studied; I have pondered.
It is truly so.48
The poems suggest that affective harmony is created by attending to events 
shared with others, and unfolding before oneself in the here-and-now. Echo-
ing this theme, the Analects notes that harmony is the guiding concern of the 
social activity of ritual interaction (1.12), and the aim of affective harmony be-
tween people is well-captured in the image of Confucius joining in with the 
harmonies of his disciples’ songs (7. 32).
The poems above also suggest something else. Affective harmony is  directed 
towards a certain endpoint or goal. It gives actions something to aim at, a 
teleological structure. This is the realization of a particular affective experi-
ence: joy or delight (le 樂). Notably, the character for delight (le 樂) and its 
 musical  counterpart (yue 樂, see below), appear more frequently in the Ana-
lects (48 times) than filial conduct (xiao) and appropriateness or justice (yi) 
 combined—two concepts usually thought central to Confucian morality. 
 Perhaps the most vivid expression of delight’s importance is found in the Men-
cius.49 Here, delight is the euphoric outcome of cultivating the Confucian vir-
tues of humaneness (ren), appropriateness or justice (yi), wisdom (zhi), and 
ritual propriety (li):
Mencius said:
The greatest fruit (shi) of humaneness (ren) is serving one’s parents. The 
greatest fruit of a sense of justice and appropriateness (yi) is going along 
47 Trans. Li Chenyang, “The Ideal of Harmony in Ancient Greek and Chinese Philosophy,” 81.
48 Ibid, 82.
49 For the ethical importance of delight and the shared experience of it, see Mencius 1A2; 
2B1; 2B4.
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with one’s elder brother. The greatest fruit of wisdom (zhi) is knowing 
these two things and not abandoning them. The greatest fruit of ritual 
propriety (li) is regulating and civilizing these two. The greatest fruit of 
music is taking joy (le) in these two. When there is joy, they grow. When 
they grow, how can they be stopped? If they cannot be stopped, then 
without realizing, one’s feet begin to step in time to them and one’s hands 
dance according to their rhythms.50
This passage conveys the remarkable idea that when relationships with parents 
and siblings go well, following Confucian virtues, they result in a crescendo of 
emotional experience so intense that spontaneous dancing erupts. Confirm-
ing the importance of delight, passage 6.20 in the Analects offers a hierarchical 
account of individual experience in which the capacity for delight is primary: 
“Knowing is no match for liking; liking is no match for delighting.”51 Conduct is 
ordered by taking affective sensibilities as basic data to guide action.
 Structuring Delight through Music and Ritual
Just as there are several conceptions of harmony, so delight is not the only end 
at which action aims. Maintaining “face” and avoiding shame are also integral to 
Confucian harmony. However, the texts convey confidence that delight can re-
sponsibly coordinate action, and is not merely a capricious private experience. 
This is confirmed by the second meaning of the character for delight or joy. The 
same character also means musical conduct (yue 樂), understood broadly to 
include singing and dancing, and the coordinated activity of making music.52 
The Book of Rites illustrates the power of music to coordinate emotions and 
conduct, here within the framework of the five cardinal relationships:
50 Mencius 4A27, translation mine, following Irene Bloom’s Mencius. Cf. the Great Preface 
to the Book of Songs: “Song is the result of dispositions. It resides in the heart-mind as 
dispositions and is articulated in language as song. One’s feelings stir within one’s breast, 
and take form in words. When words are inadequate, they are voiced as sighs. When sighs 
are inadequate, they are chanted. When chants are inadequate, unconsciously, the hands 
and feet begin to dance them.” Legge, The Chinese Classics, 4: 34.
51 Other Analects passages on the social dimension of delight include 3.3 and 16.5.
52 The idea that harmony in music can bring about harmony between people predates the 
Confucian texts, and is found in the oracle bones and bronze inscriptions. See Chenyang 
Li, “The Confucian Ideal of Harmony.”
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For this reason, when there is music in the ancestral temple, both ruler 
and minister, superior and inferior listen to it together, and none fails to 
be harmonious and respectful. When there is music among the clan el-
ders and townspeople, elder and younger listen to it together, and none 
fails to be harmonious and orderly. When it is played within the gates 
and doorways of a house, father and son, older and younger brother to-
gether listen to it, and none fails to be harmonious and intimate. Thus it 
is music…that unites father and son, ruler and minister; it is music that 
creates familial bonds among a myriad of peoples. This is the method 
behind the former kings’ establishment of music.53
These elements for directing conduct—the coordinating of affective experi-
ence, delight, and their use to ensure that human relationships go well—are 
combined in another foundational element of Confucian social life: ritual 
(li 禮).54 Confucian ritual can be understood in several ways, some highly con-
servative. Here, however, the important sense is the coordination of action and 
creation of affective experiences through ritual.
The Analects confirms that ritual is more than merely performing roles ac-
cording to a script. Confucius declares:
In referring time and again to observing ritual propriety (li), how could I 
just be talking about gifts of jade and silk? In referring time and again to 
making music (yue), how could I just be talking about bells and drums?”55
Ritual is significant not for its rule-like formality, but for the affective expe-
rience bound up with its performance.56 Passage 8.8 confirms ritual’s role in 
creating a subject sensitized to the creation of delight: “The Master said: the 
Songs arouse [the affective life], ritual shapes it [around the social world] and 
musical experience brings it to completion.”57
53 Zehou Li, The Chinese Aesthetic Tradition, 19. A similar passage appears in the Watson, 
Xunzi, 113.
54 On the gradual historical shaping of emotions around communal practices and symbols 
in China, see Li Zehou, The Chinese Aesthetic Tradition.
55 Ames and Rosemont, Analects of Confucius, 206.
56 Other passages emphasizing affective experience in ritualized interaction include 1.13, 3.3, 
3.4 and 3.26.
57 1.12 offers a historical endorsement of this function of ritual, “The most valuable func-
tion of ritual is [the creation of] harmony; it is precisely such harmony that made the 
way of the former kings a thing of beauty.” In 8.8, xing could be read without an affective 
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To make this approach to ritual clearer, consider it independently of the 
texts for a moment, simply as a gathering of people in which all participate in 
a social event.58 Ritual directs people’s attention towards a communal event, 
giving each a role, and structures participants’ affective experiences around 
the constitutive practices and gestures. All participants play their part in con-
tributing to an overall effect. To see this, consider an analogy with a sporting 
event. The players, coaches, referees and crowd each have their part to play in 
the event going well. Without umpires, the game descends into bickering be-
tween players; without an audience, the players are less motivated. The actions 
of each are also constrained by certain norms (the rules of the game for players 
and referees, reliable strategies for coaches, and non-abusive chants for the 
supporters) while still leaving room for interpretation and personal effort (ref-
erees have to make interpretive inferences from the rules, based on their own 
experiences and judgments). Whether the event goes well or badly depends 
on the contribution of each of these participants. But the event itself, consid-
ered as a whole, forms the object for an important kind of affective experience, 
which we are here calling delight, and which distinguishes it as an event. The 
delight that participants feel is based partly on their contribution to the overall 
event, and also on their response to or appreciation of that event.
Notably, the memory of the event also serves to regulate and direct action. 
Participants might seek to repeat the experience, and become more civilized 
in other areas of personal interaction away from the stadium in order to pre-
serve the conditions necessary for this. They might also feel a certain respect 
for those who shared in it and even a preparedness to identify with and pro-
tect the community that contributed to it. A sporting event thus provides a 
semi-formal way of harmonizing people’s attitudes and affective experiences; 
so does ritual in classical Confucian thought.
 An Alternative Form of Friendship: Event Friendship
We have now examined all the elements of a distinctive approach to action, 
one that also suggests a distinctive conception of friendship. The same kind of 
memorable and moving social event created in ritual, can be created in friend-
ship, with one modification. As ritual structures delight and secures a certain 
element, as simply “flourish” or “begin” (see 13.5). But xing in the Analects often has an 
affective and motivational sense of “inspiring” or “arousing” (8.2 and 17.9).
58 Roy Rappaport (Ecology, Meaning, and Religion) discusses what makes an event a ritual, 
and analyzes the constitutive features of ritual.
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quality of interaction in formal contexts, so the same aim pursued between 
people in unstructured or informal contexts is a form of friendship. As the very 
first line of the Analects notes, describing the event of a long-delayed reunion, 
“To have a friend visit from afar, is it not a joy (le)?”59
Friendship as an agreeable, shared emotional experience created by will-
ing participants is encapsulated by 11.26. Confucius asks his students how they 
might express their worth or achievements, and after the other disciples have 
given answers pertaining to the political realm, the disciple Zengxi answers:
At the end of spring with the spring clothes having already been finished, 
I would like, in the company of five or six young men and six or seven 
children, to cleanse ourselves in the Yi River, to revel in the cool breezes 
at the Altar for Rain and then return home singing. The Master heaved a 
deep sigh and declared, ‘I’m with Zengxi!’60
Friendship can consist in the quest for affective harmony—shared delight—
through unplanned and unstructured activities as these arise among people in 
the course of the day. For the Confucians, those who can create moving experi-
ences as they advance through the rolling series of personal interactions that 
make up a day are sages, and acquire a form of charismatic authority.
A useful metaphor for this friendship, which captures the Confucian linkage 
of music and action, is an informal musical “jamming” session. When people 
gather to make music, the responses of each musician depend on the notes 
played by others. The notes played must harmonize with others, and a dis-
cordant note ruins the overall effect. This requires skill and attentiveness; but 
there is room for creativity and novelty; any participant can try something new, 
something playful, within the constraints of the music. When this interaction 
goes well, there is an overall effect that is shared by all—the exhilaration of 
being in harmony with others, of contributing to the experience and sharing 
in it with others.
Moving from music to daily life, and unlike close friendships, this account 
presents an “ethical task” for friendship, a novel conception of obligation. This 
is twofold: to transform routine interpersonal interactions into events; and 
to extend the circle of people with whom such events are created. The latter 
is possible because the basis for action is transferred from close friendship’s 
knowledge of character to imaginatively integrating all people and features of 
the situation into the event.
59 Analects 1.1, translation mine.
60 Analects 11.26, trans. Ames and Rosemont.
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 Evaluating Event Friendship
Event friendship avoids the tension between close friendships and impartial-
ity. It does so because in realizing harmony, event friendship realizes a moral 
ideal, and the demands of friendship and of morality are thus aligned.
But event friendship has relevance outside the Confucian tradition, since 
it is also less susceptible to the objections directed at the impartial viewpoint 
and at close friendships. It satisfies the intuitive demand for impartiality, with-
out relying on an impartial standpoint, and in a way that close friendships do 
not. Close friendships are often restricted and exclusive. In contrast, event 
friendship can be initiated with a much broader range of people. Furthermore, 
the practical ideal of achieving a quality of interaction is open with regard to 
who can participate. Events can be created by a group of people, not merely 
two who share an intimate bond.
Similarly, there are no barriers arising from the time needed to become fa-
miliar with another’s character or the need to develop a sense of admiration, 
liking or care for that particular person. It is therefore more open to those who 
are initially strangers than close friendship. An individual life might in reality 
be made up of interactions with a very limited number of people, but there is 
no principled distinction between an inner core of intimates and an exclud-
ed periphery; there are no formal restrictions on who may participate in this 
friendship. This openness is thus a form of impartiality, since a quality of inter-
action can be achieved with anyone who enters the subject’s local social world.
Event friendships are less personal than close friendships. It also appears to 
derive from a duty-like disposition to create social events, which for the Con-
fucians is the result of socialization into social roles and family duties. This 
contrasts with the folk belief that friendship is a voluntary matter, a matter 
of choice. But overemphasizing individual character, goodwill, similarity and 
choice can obscure other valuable forms of friendship. Close friendships might 
be more intense, and subjectively more important, and yet be a less ethical 
form of friendship than relationships with people who are not our best friends.
An objection might be raised against claiming event friendship as an ethical 
phenomenon. Namely, that it makes morality too parochial, too ignorant of 
wider social issues. It loses the capacity to criticize social structure and im-
personal states of affairs. Many ethical problems cannot be resolved through 
personal bonds.
Two points can be offered in response. First, most people’s experience of 
‘morality’ is local and social. The majority of issues that occupy many people 
focus on their local community. How they get along with those encountered 
on most days or for the first time, what antagonisms arise during the flow 
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of daily interactions, and the degree of trust and social standing they enjoy, 
are the salient practical issues. Maintenance of a broad web of affective re-
lationships appears as important for a good life as a few close friends. Event 
friendship draws on this view of morality as something local, social and inter-
personal, rather than as abstract and remote practical dilemmas infrequently 
 confronted, such as abortion, euthanasia and just war—often the focus in con-
temporary  applied ethics.
Further, personal relationships are not politically impotent. Amorphous or 
rhizome-like webs of friendship-like relationships can influence, by-pass or 
even oppose political authority. For example, when centrally-issued laws are 
insufficiently responsive to local communities, webs of affective ties act as a 
corrective. Guanxi networks (networks of personal connections) in modern 
East Asian societies yield examples of this.61
Second, perhaps “morality” is not a unitary phenomenon, but is constituted 
by different realms of practical activity, in which different normative ideals 
apply. In the political realm, theoretical impartiality might be paramount. But 
when decisions arise in more local and personal contexts, then friendship and 
its practices are a better guide. On this view, practical wisdom consists in grasp-
ing how best to conceptualize a situation, and thus which kind of moral think-
ing should guide action. This would be a kind of ethical relativism, shorn of a 
single standard of moral rightness; but it need not be pernicious, as  practical 
disputes could still be resolved to people’s satisfaction.
 Conclusion
Barry’s dilemma illustrates the tension between the perspectives of the impar-
tial standpoint and that of close friends, and that which should take priority 
is sometimes unclear. In fact, Barry eventually testified against Hank. But oth-
ers might believe a different conclusion was warranted. Analects 13.18, for ex-
ample, approves of a son who covers for a father when the latter steals a sheep, 
rather than turn him over to the authorities.
In fact, the early Confucian tradition cannot provide an easy resolution to 
Barry’s dilemma; there isn’t one. But exploring the tradition makes clearer the 
assumptions about friendship and morality that generate the tension, and 
illustrates how the two have been conceptualized differently in different times 
and places. In classical Confucian thought the categories of personal relation-
ships and morality converge, finding unity in the ideal of harmony. Applying 
61 Otis and Lo, “Guanxi Civility”; Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets.
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this insight to more contemporary times reveals that it is possible to think in 
the wrong way about friendship. Relying on thoughts of freedom, choice and 
preference, and driven by attraction and inclination, might mean a failure 
to develop relationships that might be developed with a different sensibility 
or understanding of the situation. The Confucian account makes us think of 
friendship as a task, driven by the possibility of creating events that stir both 
parties.
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